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SUPREM COURT REVIEW
(1970)
Foreword (or Backward?): The Year After Warren
JON R. WALTZ*
Mr. Justice Brandeis wrote that "The purpose
[of the doctrine of separation of powers] was, not
to avoid friction, but, by means of the inevitable
friction... to save the people from autocracy."'
He insisted that conflict between the three federal
branches was a necessary evil.
Since May of 1969 the Supreme Court, the
pinnacle of the federal judicial department, has
found itself embroiled in controversy to an extent
unprecedented since Franklin Delano Roosevelt's
1937 court-packing attempt. This most recent
testing of Brandeis' thesis began with the pres-
sures brought to bear, rightly or wrongly but with
obvious success, to force Abe Fortas off the high
bench. With a new vacancy to be filled, conflict
boiled up twice again in rapid succession as Presi-
dent Richard M. Nixon practiced his own more
orthodox approach to reconstituting a Court whose
philosophy had become increasingly distasteful to
the newly elected Chief Executive and his follow-
ers.
The resulting prolongation of the Fortas vacancy
prevented the Supreme Court from attending to
some of its important business. Of greater long-
range significance, it placed the Court once again
in the eye of a public storm which would give it a
buffeting it could ill afford. Even so, this institu-
tion that has lived for controversy exhibited
throughout an admirable if perhaps false calm.
And, as the students who are the authors of this
* Professor of Law, Northwestern University.
Lecturer in Medical Jurisprudence, Northwestern
University Medical School. Member, Ohio and Illinois
Bars. Author, CASES AND MAr ERAIS ON EVIDENCE
(with David W. Louisell and John Kaplan), 1968; PUN-
CIPLEs or EVIDENCE AND PROOF (with David W.
Louisell and John Kaplan), 1968; THE TRIAL or JACK
RUBY (with John Kaplan), 1965; and the forthcoming
MEDICAL JumsPRUDENcE (with Fred E. Inbau).
I Meyers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 293 (1926).
inaugural review of Supreme Court decisions in
the criminal field will demonstrate in the pages
ahead, it somehow managed to go about much of
its work.
The thirteen-month interregnum between Fortas
and Harry A. Blackmun exposed the sort of
machinations that frequently underlie the only
meaningful form of direct political control over
the Supreme Court, the nomination and confirma-
tion powers.2 President Nixon used his authority
in an open and unabashed effort to influence future
judicial policy and, at the same time and by the
same effort, to repay campaign debts run up in the
course of what has been denominated somewhat
inflatedly as his Southern Strategy. The President
made clear his intention to pick for the Supreme
Court men who could be counted on to be stinting
in their use of judicial power-men who, he said,
would be "strict constructionists," whatever that
term meant to him 4 His nominations of Clement
F. Haynsworth, Jr., and G. Harrold Carswell,
2 ,. .. by and with the Advice and Consent of the
Senate, [the President] shall appoint. . .Judges of the
Supreme Court ..... ." U.S. CONST. art. 2, § 2. See
Swindler, The Politics of "Advice and Consent," 56
A.B.A.J. 533 (1970).
3 See T. WirE, THE MAKING Or m PRESIDENT
1968 171-72 (1969). See generally J. WrrcovER, THE
RESUREcTIoN or RCnIuu NixoN (1970).
4President Nixon would probably not care to par-
take of the argument-a tenable one-that William
0. Douglas, despite his occasionally cavalier approach
to opinion-writing, is a strict constructionist in the
Jeffersonian sense in which that unsatisfactory phrase
is most commonly employed. This, of course, is not the
place for that argument but anyone who doubts that it
can be made might take a look at Douglas's concurring
opinion in Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 39-40
(1968). And I like Professor William W. Van Alstyne's
recent remark: "Mr. Justice Douglas has a very rugged
Constitution." Van Astyne, The Constitutional Rights
of Public Employees: A Comment on the Appropriate
Uses of an Old Analogy, 16 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 751, 772
(1969).
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clearly, and of Blackmun arguably, were in execu-
tion of the presidential specifications for recon-
structing the Court. The United States Senate, to
its enduring credit, employed its power to extract
from the executive branch a higher degree of
responsibility than was exhibited in the first two
of these nominations.
Richard Nixon was not doing something untried
by his predecessors. History has revealed the tend-
ency of presidents to add to the judiciary men who,
at the time of their appointment, apparently stood
for principles which the then chief executive would
himself have espoused were he on the bench. 5 In
its turn, the Senate-regardless of whether or not
its majority was drawn from the President's po-
litical party-has ordinarily confirmed such
nominees, granting to the President a certain
ideological leeway in filling judicial vacancies.6
Between 1898 and 1969, as enterprising columnists
repeatedly reminded us at the peak of the Hayns-
worth-Carswell disasters, only one man placed in
nomination for a Supreme Court seat-John
Parker of North Carolina-was rejected by the
Senate, and he failed by a single vote.7 The swift
5 T. WmTr, supra note 4, at 171. See also Swindler,
The Warren Court: Completion of a Constitutoal
.Revolution, 29 VAND. L. Rnv. 205 (1970). Presidents, of
course, have often been foiled by their own appointees.
To take some Twentieth Century examples, Woodrow
Wilson's first appointee, Justice McReynolds, usually
cancelled the vote of Wilson's only other appointee,
Brandeis. Theodore Roosevelt on occasion felt badly
let down by Oliver Wendell Holmes. Felix Frankfurter
was not the judicial activist that F.D.R. had antid-
ated. Earl Warren's flexibility as Chief Justice must
ve come as something of a surprise to Dwight Eisen-
hower; Byron White's rigidity must have chagrined
John F. Kennedy. See S. KusLov, THE SUPREwxE
COtmT Tim PoLrICAL PRocEss 5-6 (1965).
8 In the mid-Nineteenth Century, however, the
Senate-eyeing ideological differences over slavery
and Reconstruction issues-rejected fully one-quarter
of the names submitted to it for the Supreme Court.
See J. HARP s, ThE ADvIcE AN CONSENT oP TE
SENATE 46-98 (1968). The number of unsuccessful
nominations to the Court now stands, after 180 years
-of American judicial history, at twenty-six. Eleven were
rejected by a recorded vote of the Senate; seven were
withdrawn by the President when it became clear that
Senate approval could not be obtained. As to the re-
maining eight the Senate either took no action or
announced that action would be "postponed" indefi-
nitely. Six other nominees were approved by the Senate
but refused to accept appointment; a seventh, Edwin
M. Stanton, was confirmed by the Senate but died
before he could be commissioned and sworn in. For a
detailed tabulation of nominations that were declined or
rejected, see Swindler, supra note 2, at 536.
7It was during this period that the nomination of
Louis D. Brandeis generated active if obfuscating
contention. After prolonged debate his nomination was
approved by a 47-22 vote, with twenty-seven Senators
abstaining. See A. MASoN, BRANrDEs chs. 30-31 (1956).
and unanimous confirmation of Judge Blackmun,
an apparent judicial conservative,8 fit the sena-
torial tradition of honoring the presidential pre-
rogative. But what of the Senate's rejections of
Haynsworth and Carswell? In practical effect, who
was really structuring the Supreme Court, the
executive branch or the legislative?
It has been argued by some, including the Presi-
dent himself, that ideological and geographical
biases alone accounted for the successful massing
of opposition to the two Southerners.9 Fortu-
nately, much more than that was involved. A
majority of the Senate, supported by large num-
bers of constituents, felt moved to reject the two
nominees in consideration of what the Senators
discerned to be the two most essential qualifica-
tions for appointment to the Supreme Court. For
all their occasional fury and bitterness, the sena-
torial battles swirling around Haynsworth and
Carswell reaffirmed the wisdom of lodging with
the Senate a watchdog function. To put the same
proposition more bluntly, these struggles-and
their humiliating outcome-reaffirmed the presi-
dential obligation to send to the Supreme Court
only individuals of the highest ethical and in-
tellectual quality. 0
8 There is no need to speculate regarding the direction
Mr. Justice Blackmun will take in the future. One of
the most reliable sources for such predictions has now
spoken. Jeane Dixon, the well-known psychic, reports
that "Supreme Court Justice Harry Blackmun will
turn out to be much more of a strict constructionist in
criminal matters than his followers anticipated."
Chicago Tribune, June 28, 1970, § 5, at 13, col. 2.
OPresident Nixon described the Senate's rejection of
nominee G. Harrold Carswell as an "act of regional
discrimination" and added that "This Senate as it is
presently constituted will not approve a man from the
South who shares my view .... " NEwswEEx, April 20,
1970, at 35. The President was silent a few months later
when the citizens of Judge Carswell's own state, Florida,
rejected his bid for a seat in the U.S. Senate.
10 The Constitution makes no provision for minimum
qualifications for judges. It does not specify patterns of
education and training. Not even the requisites of
citizenship and minimum age imposed upon the Presi-
dent and members of the Congress are applied to the
federal judiciary. This void could have been filled by
either the executive or the legislative branch but both
have declined to set formal qualifications for the federal
bench. See J. GROssnsAw, LAWYERS AND JuDGEs 23
(1965). Non-governmental guardians of the public's
expectations are usually vague when discussing judicial
qualifications. It is not much help when, for example, a
New York Times editorialist delivers his newspaper of
the pronouncement that "Judges are something special
in our form of government; the most exacting standards
can be none too high." Editorial, N.Y. Times, July 2,
1963, at 28, col. 1. For a long time, however, there has
existed the notion that intellect and integrity are ele-
mental aspects of the appropriate formula. Thus
Francis Bacon said, "Judges ought to be more learned
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The Senate's vote in the Haynsworth episode
evidenced a gnawing doubt about the appointment
of a man whose judicial conduct now and again
bore at least an appearance of impropriety. Judge
Haynsworth's honesty and integrity were not
directly impugned by responsible spokesmen; his
sensitivity to ethical norms and to the necessity
for avoiding even the appearance of evil were as-
suredly called into question. If the Senate's
judgment in the Haynsworth matter seemed harsh
to some, it nonetheless reiterated one standard
against which the executive, in the discharge of a
key obligation to the nation, must measure every
judicial nominee.
Judge G. Harrold Carswell's rebound nomina-
tion raised the second pivotal question that chief
executives are supposed to ask themselves before
submitting Supreme Court nominations to the
Senate for its advice and consent. When a potential
nominee's stock portfolio and his conscience appear
to be in order, judgment as to the propriety of his
appointment must rest on professional qualities--
on the demonstrated power and range of his in-
tellect. Carswell's nomination at first seemed the
ideal sequel to the abortive effort to elevate Hayns-
worth: the Florida judge apparently had almost
no capital assets and none of those he had ap-
peared to pose any conflict of interests. As cautious
Senators and various outside organizations scru-
tinized Carswell's record, however, one unsettling
fact began to emerge. Aside from a few indications
that he was or at least in times past had been
something of a racist, Carswell's record as lawyer
and jurist seemed indistinguishable from that of
countless other lawyers and judges in the nation.
Appointment to the Supreme Court is the highest
honor that can come to a member of the legal
profession and many a lawyer and many a layman
began to question what Harrold Carswell had ever
done to deserve the ultimate prize.
Despite one Senator's straightfaced suggestion
that the mediocre segment of America's popula-
tion was entitled to a representative on the coun-
try's highest court," the charge that Carswell
lacked a crucial qualification was not casually to
be tossed aside. Strength of intellect can properly
be demanded of Supreme Court justices. Intellect,
than witty ... and more advised than confident. Above
all things, integrity is their portion and proper vir-
tue. .. 2" F. BACON, EsSAYS: OF JUDICATURE, in 1
Tnm Woitxs op FR.xcis BAcOx 58-59 (B. Montague
ed. 1852).
n Remarks of Sen. Roman Hruska (R-Neb.), quoted
in N.Y. Times, Mar. 17, 1970, at 21, col. 1.
coupled with experience and common sense, is the
basic working equipment of the effective case-
decider. Furthermore, resolving controversies is
not the judge's only function. As Eugene V. Rostow
once put it, "The Supreme Court is, among other
things, an educational body and the Justices are
inevitably teachers in a vast national seminar." 12
The corp-us of Supreme Court opinions serves as
the nation's textbook on such vital and complex
subjects as the living Constitution, the functioning
of federalism and the answers to an endless stream
of "federal questions." Elevation to the Court re-
quires of a man (or, one of these days, a woman)
that degree of intellectual power and clarity which
will equip the nominee to act as educator of the
American people on the nature and meaning of
law. The Senate looked at Judge Harrold Carswell
with care and decided not to name him to the
faculty.
At last Mr. Nixon faced up to the fact that the
Senate of the United States would not permit
presidential deviation from fundamental stand-
ards in the filling of the Fortas vacancy. He sent
up the name of Harry Blackmun, whose attributes
could survive measurement against those refined
standards, and the Senate--with an almost audi-
ble sigh of relief-confirmed his nomination.
The prolonged presidential delay in submitting
a name that the Senate could in good faith act
upon favorably did delay Court treatment of a
few crucial issues, such as the constitutionality of
the death penalty. 3 What is perhaps even more
frustrating to students preparing an analysis of a
year's criminal adjudication, the long delay fore-
stalled meaningful appraisal of President Nixon's
progress in reshaping the Court in his own image.
The performance in the past year of Mr. Nixon's
first Supreme Court appointee, Chief Justice War-
ren E. Burger, provides only fragmentary indicia of
the President's success at reining in the Court. In
the criminal law field, however, Chief Justice
Burger has supplied some evidence, mostly by the
company he keeps on the Court, that at least in
time he will be able to do what he was sent to the
Court to do, that is, halt if not reverse the activist
trend of what has come to be known compendi-
ously as the Warren Court. If there is any dis-
cernible thread running through the major
constitutional criminal law opinions written or
joined in by the new Chief Justice during the
12 Rostow, The Denocratic Character of Judicial
Review, 66 HAuv. L. REv. 193, 208 (1952).
13 See, e.g., Maxwell v. Bishop, 398 U.S. 262 (1970).
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October Term, 1969-1970, it would have to be
described as a reluctance to move much beyond
the pales driven by the Warren Court. Alexander
Bickel of the Yale Law School has called Burger's
-first term "the year of the pause." 14 But "pause"
implies the eventual resumption of a higher level
of activity. It is by no means certain that Warren
Burger's Supreme Court will resume the velocity
of Earl Warren's. The Court remained an active
one during the last term but its forward movement
can be measured in jurisprudential inches instead
of the old Warren miles. The Burger Court moved
not as a vehicle picking up momentum but as one
to which powerful brakes were being applied.
Shifting the metaphor, perhaps the post-Warren
year could properly be dubbed the year of the
gathering lull.
Although Burger's first year was one of de-
-celeration, it was not, by and large, a year for
cancelling past gains. The Supreme Court, during
its past term, showed continued sensitivity in
several controversial sectors. It did so, most fre-
quently, over its Chief Justice's dissent.
In Toussie v. United States,15 for example, the
Court held that a young man who had failed to
register for the draft could not be penalized for
this failure on the basis of a prosecution brought
eight years after his initial registration date. The
five-year statute of limitation, it was held, began
its run six days after the boy's eighteenth birthday.
The Court declined to declare the offense a con-
tinuing one; had it done so, the limitation period
would have commenced only after the defendant's
twenty-sixth birthday, exposing him to prosecu-
tion until he was thirty-one years old. The Chief
Justice joined in an ill-tempered dissenting opinion
written by Justice White. 6
In Gutknecht v. United States" the Court struck
down the Selective Service Administration's "de-
linquency regulations" as being without statutory
authorization, thereby displaying an alert ap-
preciation of the exigencies inherent in a bureauc-
racy that becomes, on occasion, savagely
self-serving. Chief Justice Burger joined in a sub-
stantially narrower concurrence written by Justice
Potter Stewart.
It was held in In re Winship18 that the standard
14 Quoted in TniE, July 13, 1970, at 11.
15397 U.S. 112 (1970).
16397 U.S. at 124.
17 396 U.S. 295 (1970).
18 397 U.S. 358 (1970). In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967),
held that juveniles must be accorded the safeguards of
a criminal trial when their asserted conduct, at issue in
of proof beyond a reasonable doubt is applicable,
as a constitutional dictate, to juvenile proceedings.
Chief Justice Burger and Potter Stewart joined in
a dissent 9 that demonstrates little more than that
neither man has ever had much to do either with
juvenile courts or with the detention facilities to
which such tribunals regularly consign children.
If constitutional cases are increasingly to be based
on sociological facts-Professor Kenneth Culp
Davis' "legislative facts" '2-then judges must
somehow try to find out what those facts really
are. (As an aside, Justice Black's separate dis-
sent" in Winship is fascinating in that-mirabile
dictid-it might have been written by the late
Felix Frankfurter.)
In one sensitive area the Court rendered opin-
ions that can be criticized on legalistic grounds as
well as on more subjective bases. In McMann v.
Richardson,"2 Brady v. United States" and Parker
v. North Carolina4 a majority of the Court, in-
cluding the Chief justice, effectively foreclosed
defendants from attacking the voluntariness of
their guilty pleas. If the law's interest in the per-
fection of docket-clearing devices is legitimate on
the criminal side as well as the civil, and surely it
is, then plea bargaining has its place in the scheme
of criminal procedure. However, as the dissenters
in Parker point out,25 it does not follow from the
undeniable circumstance that an accused cannot
always be insulated from every potential improper
inducement to plead guilty that he should be
shielded from none.
Chief Justice Burger does not invariably drag
his feet. In Waller v. Florida26 he cast a cold eye
on Florida's effort to avoid a double jeopardy
claim by the sophistry of likening a state and one
of its municipalities to the federal government
and one of the several states. 7 But the foolhardi-
juvenile court proceedings, was criminal in character.
However, Gault left open the standard of proof ques-
tion.
19 397 U.S. at 375.
20 K. DAvis, Ai~mnmSTATrvx LAW § 15.03 (1959).
Of course, there are those who have recognized the
possible dangers inherent in appellate court reliance
on "facts" outside the record. See, e.g., Cahn, Juris-
prudence, 1954 SuRwvE op AmERicAN LAW 809, 826-27.
"397 U.S. at 377.
22 397 U.S. 759 (1970).
23397 U.S. 742 (1970).
24 397 U.S. 790 (1970).
25 397 U.S. at 799 (Brennan, J., joined by justices
Douglas and Marshall).
26397 U.S. 387 (1970).
2The Chief Justice was surely on the side of the
angels in another Florida case as well. In Dickey v.
Florida, 398 U.S. 30 (1970), Chief Justice Burger wrote
1970]
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ness of long-range and over-general predictions
about how judges will behave is reaffirmed by
Ashe v. Swenson,2 8 another double jeopardy case
involving that slippery concept, collateral estoppel.
In Ashe one is confronted by a sharp split between
the new Chief Justice and, of all people, Potter
Stewart, with Stewart taking the "liberal" ap-
proach and Burger, in dissent, adopting a dis-
tinctly "conservative" stance.
In some respects the most intriguing case to
come before the Supreme Court during the past
term was Illinois v. Allen2 9, in which an Illinois
trial judge, after demonstrating what is generally
contemplated by the phrase "the patience of
Job," excluded an obstreperous0 defendant from
his own trial. In Allen the Supreme Court, in an
opinion written by Justice Black and joined by
Chief Justice Burger, rebuffed the Seventh Cir-
cuit's conclusion that a criminal accused, no matter
how irrepressible, can never be barred from the
courtroom ". . .and that the judge's ultimate
remedy... is to bind and gag him." 31 With both
eyes on American justice's latest self-inflicted
wound, the trial of the so-called "Chicago 8" 32
for, among other things, violation of the anti-riot
amendment to the 1968 Civil Rights Act, 3 justice
Black declared "... that a defendant [by his
persistently disruptive behavior in the face of
admonition] can lose his right to be present at
trial."34 Black attempted to catalog the avenues
open to a beleaguered trial judge. Confronted
for the Court in deciding that the accused was denied
his right to a speedy trial where he had at all times
been available to the state during an eight-year period
following commission of the criminal acts alleged and
in fact had made repeated efforts to secure a prompt
trial. During the eight-year interval two witnesses had
died, other potential defense witnesses were alleged to
have become unavailable, police records had been lost
or destroyed and the state could offer no valid reason
for the delay. See also Williams v. Illinois, 399 U.S. 235
(1970).
S397 U.S. 436 (1970).
29397 U.S. 337 (1970). See Flaum & Thompson,
The Case of the Disruptive Defendant: Illinois v. Allen,
61 J. Cpar. L. C. & P. S. 327 (1970).
30 The defendant was appearing pro se, although the
trial court had appointed counsel to "sit in and protect
the record." 397 U.S. at 339. Incapable of conducting
his own defense, the defendant began berating the
judge. The high point of the dialogue was reached when
the defendant announced, "When I go out for lunchtime
you're [i.e., the trial judge] going to be a corpse here."
Id.
31397 U.S. at 342.
32 United States v. Dellinger, Crim. No. 69-180 (N.D.
Ill. 1969).
18 U.S.C. §§ 2101-02.
4 397 U.S. at 343.
with an unruly defendant, the judge could "...
(1) bind and gag him... ; (2) cite him for con-
tempt; (3) take him out of the courtroom until he
promises to conduct himself properly." 11
It is reasonably dear that the first expedient on
Black's list was intended as a measure to be re-
sorted to only after all else had failed. Although
hedging somewhat toward the end of his opinion,
justice Black explicitly stated that ". . . no person
should be tried while shackled and gagged except
as a last resort." 86 Justice Brennan, concurring,
stressed the same point, remarking that "It of-
fends not only judicial dignity and decorum, but
also that respect for the individual which is the
lifeblood of the law." 7
The Allen decision is badly misread by those
who suggest that it places a general imprimatur
on the gagging and shackling of the defendant
Bobby G. Seale, co-chairman of the militant Black
Panther Party, during the Democratic Convention
riot conspiracy case. There the trial judge em-
ployed gag and thong as a first or, at best, second
and hardly last resort. Seale, insistent upon either
the presence of the defense attorney of his own
choice or the right to represent himself, was ac-
corded neither; the trial judge refused a relatively
brief delay in the trial's commencement to permit
participation by Seale's counsel and thereafter
steadfastly refused to experiment even briefly
with a pro se effort by Seale. At the outset of his
troubles with Seale the trial judge-who, after all,
was dealing with a layman-was archly cryptic in
suggesting the possibility of a contempt citation.*
35 397 U.S. at 344.36 Id.
17 397 U.S. at 350-51.
18 The following is representative of the trial judge'%
early admonitions: "... any outburst ... will be ap-
propriately dealt with at the right time during this
trial.... " Rec. 3145. When eventually defendant
Seale inquired whether he was being threatened with a
contempt citation, the trial judge responded, "I will
not argue with you." Rec. 3146. Later the trial judge,
without explanation of their legal significance, employed
the terms "contemptuous" and "contumacious" in
connection with Seale's conduct, Rec. 3600, but thei
reverted to his original phraseology, e.g., Rec. 3601,
3641, 3642. When the trial reached the 4,610th page
of transcript the trial judge for the first time explicitly
advised Seale that he was "... in contempt of court,'"
adding retroactively that "... you have a lot of con-
temptuous conduct against you." Rec. 4610-11. On
only one occasion did the trial court with any explicit-
ness make a contemporaneous finding, on the record,
of contempt, Rec. 4610, and on no occasion did the
court intimate the possible penalty for Seale's con-
tinued interruptions. Then, suddenly, the trial court
began to talk not of its contempt power but of its.
"... right to gag you." Rec. 4616. One day later,
[Vol. 61
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And at no time did the trial court employ the
expedient of excluding Seale from the courtroom
until he promised to remain docile. 9 Finally, and
most inexplicable of all, the trial court delayed for
an unconscionable period of time before adopting
the simplest and most dearly indicated expedient,
which, was to sever Seale from this 'multiple-
defendant case and put him to a separate trial
at which, presumably, his lawyer, fully recuperated
from the illness that had prevented his appearance
at the original trial, could be present.40
In view of the mistrial eventually declared as
to Seale, and the concomitant ordering of a new
trial as to him, the propriety of the trial court's
handling of Seale will arise in two contexts rather
than three. It will arise when reviewing courts
consider whether Seale's conviction of contempt
of court is supportable;4' it will also arise when the
October 29, 1969, the trial judge directed the marshals
to "Take that defendant into the room in there and deal
with him as he should be dealt with in this circum-
stance." Rec. 4763. Seale was bound to his chair and
gagged. See also J. EPsTEin, THE GREAT CONSPIRACY
TRAL 227-76 (1970).
29 It may well be, however, that at this juncture the
trial judge considered himself bound by the 7th Circuit's
decision in United States ex rel. Allen v. Illinois, 413
F.2d 232 (7th Cir. 1969). Decided by the 7th Circuit on
July 7, 1969, Allen was not reversed by the Supreme
Court until March 31, 1970. The "Chicago 8" trial
commenced on September 26, 1969; Seale was severed
from it on November 5, 1969.
4 See Kalven, Introduction: Confrontation and Con-
tempt in CoNTEmz xxii (D. Wagner & M. Weisman
eds. 1970). Professor Kalven, who is not given to
overwrought comment, believes that "It was politically
reckless and intrinsically unfair to have permitted
matters to get to such an impasse." Id. As one who was
present in the courtroom during the pertinent period, I
can attest the accuracy of Professor Kalven's obser-
vation.
4 It is not possible to agree completely with the
thesis advanced by prosecutors Flaum and Thompson
in their article, supra note 29 at 337, thatit is "specious"
to suggest ".... that the Allen opinion does not purport
to deal with the defendant whose unruly conduct is
'provoked' by rulings of the trial court to which he
takes exception" (authors' emphasis). A litigant is
surely not free to react in unorthodox fashion to mere
"provocations" occurring in a courtroom but this
truism has little to do with the complicated situation of
the defendant Seale in the "Chicago 8" case and it is
at least in part to Seale's conduct that Flaum and
Thompson point. The defendant Allen had been de-
prived of no apparent constitutional rights. Having
refused the helping hand of legal counsel, Allen was for
no good reason being intimidating and obnoxious as a
consequence either of calculation or of mental illness.
In the "Chicago 8" trial Seale had been deprived of the
services of the lawyer of his choice by the trial judge's
actions and was attempting in the main to act pro se,
arguing motions and cross-examining witnesses who
Jhad testified against him.
Justice Douglas, concurring in Allen, carefully
appellate courts consider the impact of the Seale
fiasco on the fair-trial rights of his seven co-
defendants.4'
Justice Douglas filed a separate opinion in
Allen4 that has attracted surprisingly little at-
tention in view of the current efforts to impeach
him because he is, according to Congressman
Gerald Ford, a teacher of violent revolution.
Douglas begins his opinion by agreeing whole-
heartedly ". . . that a criminal trial... cannot
take place where the courtroom is a bedlam.
..."4 Describing the trial courtroom as "a
hallowed place," 4 he insists that ". . . trials must
proceed with dignity and not become occasions
for entertainment by the participants, by ex-
traneous persons, [or] by modem mass media.
..., 46 But Douglas was disturbed by the selection
of a 13-year-old robbery case involving a mentally
ill defendant in which to set out guidelines for
courtroom control. Without expressly charging
distinguished the Seale type of situation from Allen's
type. See footnote 49, infra. Nothing quoted or cited
by Flaum and Thompson justifies their comment that
Douglas' ".... observation offers small comfort to the
advocates of the 'provocation' theory in light of its
explicit rejection by the seven-Justice majority in
Allen."
Of course, if the defendant in a criminal case became
obstreperous because the trial court deprived him of
constitutional rights, the propriety of binding and
gagging him will be mooted since a conviction would be
reversed because of the deprivation of constitutional
rights, not because of the subsequent repressive meas-
ures. Justice Douglas' analysis probably pertains only
to contempt convictions based upon unrepresented
accused's efforts to combat constitutional deprivations.
Hopefully, this type of situation-Seale's situation,
arguably-will remain excessively rare.
42 In a journal that possesses less prestige in academic
circles than this one but which reaches larger numbers
of laymen, I have outlined what seem to me to be the
principal legal issues raised in the course of the Chicago
riot conspiracy trial. Waltz, 13 Legal Questions Raised
by the Trial of thIe Chicago 8 Minus 1 Plus 2, PLAYBOY,
June, 1970, at 178.
43397 U.S. at 351.
44 Id.
45 Id.
41 Id. See J. KAPLAN & J. WALTz, TME TRIAL o
JACK RuBY 372 (1965), in which Stanford's John
Kaplan and I said:
The Ruby trial [for the murder of accused presi-
dential assassin Lee Harvey Oswald] was a 'state
case' and our legal procedures are not designed
for cases where all of the participants ... know
that the eyes of the nation are on them. The proc-
esses of American justice are designed for adminis-
tration in relative quiet and tranquillity....
The difficult and fundamental problem.., is that
it may be impossible for the United States ever
to afford in a 'state case' a fair trial if by this we




that his brothers should have waited for the appeal
of Bobby Seale from his contempt conviction or
for the inevitable appeals of his codefendants in
United States v. Dellinger, instead of rushing to
decide the apolitical Allen case, Douglas pointed
out that the hard problems are not to be found
in mine-run state criminal matters but in two
very special sorts of litigations: "political trials" 47
and "trials used by minorities to destroy the
existing constitutional system and bring on repres-
sive measures." 4
Douglas' descriptions closely fit the trial of
the antic "Chicago 8." At times he seems to be
addressing himself specifically to the plight of
Seale.49 Moreover, Douglas' second categorization
is likely to be germane to the trial of members
of the violent Weatherman faction of the Students
for Democratic Action that impends in the U.S.
District Court for the Northern District of Illinois
as these lines are written.
50
Douglas does not attempt a definition of the
term "political trial"; 51 he merely suggests its
contours by reference to examples: the trial of
Eugene Debs,12 the Mooney case," Spies v. People,"
47 397 U.S. at 352.
48 Id. at 356.
49 For example, Douglas inquires, "Would we tolerate
removal of a defendant from the courtroom during a
trial because he was insisting on his constitutional
rights, albeit vociferously, no matter how obnoxious his
philosophy might have been to the bench that tried
him? Would we uphold contempt in that situation?"
397 U.S. at 355. The author of a careful study of the
"Chicago 8" trial transcript insists that "... the con-
duct for which Seale was held in contempt centered on
legal argument and his insistence on what he perceived
to be denial of his constitutional rights. Most of the
[contempt] citations occurred in connection with
Seale's arguing of a legal motion or attempting, after
[defense attorneys] Kunstler and Weinglass finished
their cross-examination, to conduct his own interroga-
tion of a witness." J. DEMARco, TaE SuPRzs CouRT
A m CnmmNA CONTSMPT POWER: UNITED STATES
VERsus BOBBY G. SEALE, ANNOTATED 40 (1970) (un-
published manuscript, on file in the Library, North-
western University School of Law).
50 United States v. Evans, Crim. No. 70-195 (N.D.
Ill. 1970) (Hoffman, J.).61 Professor Anthony Amsterdam has suggested that
"... virtually every trial is a political trial when you
look at it in a social context. We operate at a time of
gravest doubt of the potential of the judicial system to
deliver justice to anyone outside the mainstream. Thus,
the trial of a poor black in Detroit for a misdemeanor
is a political trial where neither the judge, jury, cop nor
penal system is attuned to the life-style of the defendant
in any way." Quoted by Victor Navasky in Right On!
With Lawyer William Kunstler, N. Y. Times, April 19,
1970, § 6 (Magazine), at 93, col. 3. For an attempt by
one of the "Chicago 8" to define the phrase, see T.
HAYDEN, TntiAL 97-101 (1970).
5 In re Debs, 158 U.S. 564 (1895).
involving Chicago's Haymarket riots, Sacco and
Vanzetti5 and the Dennis case.56 But Justice
Douglas speaks with an informed and informing
perception, tinged with what can with perfect
aptness be called patriotism, when he warns of
the radical's perverse artifices:
Radicals on the left historically have used ...
[disruptive] tactics to incite the extreme right
with the calculated design of fostering a regime
of repression from which the radicals on the left
hope to emerge as the ultimate victor. The left
in that role is the provocateur. The Constitution
was not designed as an instrument for that form of
rough-and-tumble contest. The social compact
has room for tolerance, patience, and restraint,
but not for sabotage and violence. Trials in-
volving that spectacle strike at the very heart of
constitutional government. 7
Douglas sees that the political case differs
markedly from what can be called the subversive
case. And Douglas sees what some of his brothers
on the Court, including its Chief Justice, may not
yet perceive. That is the fact that the Supreme
Court, during the Burger years, will probably
have one opportunity after another to answer the
unique questions generated by political and sub-
versive cases. The answer to the problems posed
by subversive cases is to define workable pro-
cedures for conducting them. On the other hand,
as Justice Douglas knows, the answer to the special
difficulties inhering in political cases may "....
involve the designing of constitutional methods for
putting an end to them." " Constructing the
details of such answers demands such men as
Marshall, Holmes, Brandeis, Cardozo, Frank-
furter....
The Senate of the United States in the year
just past advised the President of the United
States that it will not consent to the knowing
appointment of lesser men to the nation's highest
court. Law students analysing future Supreme
Court terms can tell us whether Richard M.
Nixon and his successors have acted upon the
Senate's advice. That may not be the least service
supplied by the student editors of this journal.
53 Mooney v. Holohan, 294 U.S. 103 (1935).
64 122 Ill. 1, 12 N.E. 865 (1887).
55 Commonwealth v. Sacco, 255 Mass. 369, 151 N.E.
839 (1926), 259 Mass. 12&, 156 N.E. 57 (1927), 261
Mass. 12, 158 N.E. 167 (1927).
66 Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951).
57 397 U.S. at 356.
58Id.
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